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Abstract
Scholars have wondered for a long time whether quantum mechanics
(QM) subtends a quantum concept of truth which originates quantum
logic (QL) and is radically different from the classical (Tarskian) con-
cept of truth. We show in this paper that QL can be interpreted as a
pragmatic language LPQD of pragmatically decidable assertive formulas,
which formalize statements about physical systems that are empirically
justified or unjustified in the framework of QM. According to this interpre-
tation, QL formalizes properties of the metalinguistic concept of empirical
justification within QM rather than properties of a quantum concept of
truth. This conclusion agrees with a general integrationist perspective,
according to which nonstandard logics can be interpreted as theories of
metalinguistic concepts different from truth, avoiding competition with
classical notions and preserving the globality of logic. By the way, some
elucidations of the standard concept of quantum truth are also obtained.
Key words: pragmatics, quantum logic, quantum mechanics, justifi-
ability, decidability, global pluralism.
1 Introduction
The formal structure called quantum logic (QL) springs out in a natural way
from the formalism of quantum mechanics (QM). Scholars have debated for a
long time on it, wondering whether it subtends a concept of quantum truth
which is typical of QM, and a huge literature exists on this topic. We limit
ourselves here to quote the classical book by Jammer,(1) which provides a general
review of QL from its birth to the early seventies, and the recent books by
Re`dei(2) and Dalla Chiara et al.,(3) which contain updated bibliographies.
Whenever the existence of a quantum concept of truth is accepted, one sees
at once that it has to be radically different from the classical (Tarskian) concept,
since the set of propositions of QL has an algebraic structure which is different
from the structure of classical propositional logic. Thus, a new problem arises,
i.e. the problem of the “correct” logic to be adopted when reasoning in QM.
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We want to show in the present paper that the above problem can be avoided
by adopting an integrated perspective, which preserves both the globality of logic
(in the sense of global pluralism, which admits the existence of a plurality of
mutually compatible logical systems, but not of systems which are mutually
incompatible(4)) and the classical notion of truth as correspondence, which we
consider as explicated rigorously by Tarski’s semantic theory.(5,6) This perspec-
tive reconciliates non-Tarskian theories of truth with Tarski’s theory by reinter-
preting them as theories of metalinguistic concepts that are different from truth,
and can be fruitfully applied to QL. Indeed, we prove in this paper that QL can
be interpreted as a theory of the concept of empirical justification within QM.
In order to grasp intuitively our results, let us anticipate briefly some remarks
that will be discussed more extensively in Sec. 2.
First of all, it must be noted that QM usually avoids making statements
about properties of individual samples of a physical system (physical objects).
Rather, it is concerned with probabilities of results of measurements on physical
objects (standard interpretation, as espounded in any manual of QM; see, e.g.,
Refs. 7, 8 and 9), or with statistical predictions about ensembles of identically
prepared physical objects (statistical interpretation; see, e.g., Refs. 1, 10 and
11). Yet, QM also distinguishes between properties that are real (or actual)
and properties that are not real (or potential) in a given state S of the physical
system that is considered (briefly, the property E is actual in S whenever a
test of E on any physical object x in S would show that E is possessed by
x without changing S(12)). This amounts to introduce implicitly a concept of
truth that also applies to statements about individuals. Indeed, asserting that a
property E is actual in the state S is equivalent to asserting that the statement
E(x) that attributes E to a physical object x is true for every x in the state
S. Moreover, according to QM, E(x) is true, for a given x in the state S, if
and only if (briefly, iff ) E is actual in the state S.(12) Falsity is then defined
by considering a complementary property E⊥ of E, so that E(x) is false for a
given x in the state S iff E⊥ is actual in S. It follows in particular that E(x) is
true (false) for a given x in the state S iff it is true (false) for every x in S, or,
equivalently, iff it is certainly true (certainly false) in S. This result explains
the notion of true as certain introduced in some well known approaches to
QM(13,14). More important, it shows that the notion of truth has very peculiar
features in QM. Indeed, the truth and falsity of a statement E(x) about an
individual are equivalent to the truth of two universally quantified statements.
Both these statements may be false. In this case E(x) has no truth value, hence
it is meaningless. The existence of meaningless statements implies, in particular,
that no Tarskian set-theoretical semantics can be introduced in QM.
The quantum notion of truth and meaning pointed out above is typical of
the standard interpretation of QM, and it is inspired by a verificationist posi-
tion which identifies truth and verifiability, meaning and verifiability conditions.
These identifications are rather doubtful from an epistemological viewpoint, yet
it is commonly maintained in the literature that the standard quantum concep-
tion of truth has no alternatives, since it seems firmly rooted in the formalism of
QM itself. The mathematical apparatus of QM would imply indeed the impos-
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sibility of defining an assignment function associating a truth value with every
individual statement of the form E(x) by referring only to the property E and
the state S of x. The outcomes obtained in a concrete experiment whenever
E or E⊥ are not actual in S would depend on the set of observations that are
carried out simultaneously, not only on S (contextuality).(15−18)
Notwithstanding the arguments supporting it, the standard viewpoint can
be criticized, and an alternative SR interpretation of QM can be constructed
based on an epistemological position (semantic realism, or, briefly SR) which
allows one to define a truth value for every statement of the form E(x) accord-
ing to a Tarskian set-theoretical model.(19−26) Of course, all statements that are
certainly true (equivalently, true) or certainly false (equivalently, false) accord-
ing to the standard interpretation with its quantum concept of truth, are also
certainly true or certainly false, respectively, according to the SR interpretation
with its Tarskian concept of truth. The remaining statements are meaningless
according to the former interpretation, while they have truth values according
to the latter: these values, however, may change when different objects in the
same state are considered, and cannot be predicted in QM (which is, in this
sense, an incomplete theory).
Because of its intuitive, philosophical and technical advantages, we adopt
the SR interpretation in the present paper. It is then important to observe
that our definitions and reasonings take into account only statements that are
certainly true (certainly false) in the sense explained above, hence they actually
do not depend on the choice of the interpretation of QM (standard or SR).
Thus, our reinterpretation of QL should be acceptable also for logicians and
physicists who do not agree with our epistemological position. Of course, if the
SR interpretation is not accepted one loses all philosophical advantages of the
integrated perspective mentioned at the beginning of this section.
Let us come now to empirical justification. Whenever a statement E(x) is
certainly true (certainly false), its truth (falsity) can be predicted within QM if
the property E and the state S of x are known, and can be checked (by means
of nontrivial physical procedures, see Sec. 2.6). Hence, we can say that the
assertion of E(x) (E⊥(x)) is empirically justified, since we can both deduce the
truth of E(x) (E⊥(x)) inside QM and provide an empirical proof of it. More
formally, one can introduce an assertion sign ⊢ and say that E(x) is certainly
true (certainly false) iff ⊢ E(x) (⊢ E⊥(x)) is empirically justified. In this way a
semantic notion (certainty of truth) is translated into a pragmatic notion (em-
pirical justification). Now, we remind that a pragmatic extension of a classical
language and some general properties of the concept of justification have been
studied by Dalla Pozza and by the author(27) and note that all results obtained
in this research apply to the notion of empirical justification introduced above.
Moreover, further results can be obtained which are typical of the case under
consideration, since the notion of justification is now specified (empirical justi-
fication in QM). Thus, a pragmatic language LPQ can be constructed (Sec. 3) in
which assertions of the form ⊢ E(x) are taken as elementary assertive formu-
las (afs) and pragmatic connectives are introduced, for which a set-theoretical
pragmatics is defined basing on the concept of empirical justification in QM.
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This pragmatics defines a justification value for every elementary or complex
af of LPQ, yet not all complex afs of L
P
Q are pragmatically decidable, that is,
such that an empirical procedure of justification exists (it obviously exists for
all elementary afs of LPQ because of our arguments above). However, one can
single out a subset of pragmatically decidable afs of LPQ and consider a sublan-
guage LPQD of L
P
Q which contains only afs in this subset. It is then easy to see
that our set-theoretical pragmatics, when restricted to LPQD, endows it with the
structure of QL.
The above result is highly interesting in our opinion. Indeed, it provides
the desired reinterpretation of QL as a theory of the metalinguistic concept
of empirical justification in QM, allowing us to place it within an integrationist
perspective that avoids any conflict with classical logic (we stress again that this
conclusion can be accepted also by scholars who want to maintain the standard
interpretation of QM).
We conclude this Introduction by observing that our results suggest that the
standard partition of properties in two subsets (actual properties and potential
properties) should be substituted by a partition in three subsets, as follows.
Actual properties. A property E is actual in the state S iff the assertion
⊢ E(x), with x in S, is justified.
Nonactual properties. A property E is nonactual in the state S iff the asser-
tion ⊢ E⊥(x), with x in S, is justified.
Potential properties. A property E is potential in the state S iff both asser-
tions ⊢ E(x) and ⊢ E⊥(x), with x in S, are unjustified.
2 Physical preliminaries
We introduce in this section a number of symbols, definitions and physical
concepts that will be extensively used in Sec. 3 in order to supply an intuitive
support and an intended interpretation for the pragmatic language that will be
introduced there.
2.1 Basic notions and mathematical representations
The following notions will be taken as primitive.
Physical system Ω.
Pure state S of Ω, and set S of all pure states of Ω (the word pure will be
usually implied in the following).
Testable property E of Ω, and set E of all testable properties of Ω (the word
testable will be usually implied in the following).1
States and properties will be interpreted operationally as follows.
1It must be noted that the physical properties considered here are first order properties
from a logical viewpoint.(26) Higher order properties obviously occur in physics and will be
encountered later on (Sec. 2.6), but they need not be considered here.
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A state S ∈ S is a class of physically equivalent2 preparing devices (briefly,
preparations) which may prepare individual samples of Ω (physical objects). A
physical object x is in the state S iff it is prepared by a preparation pi ∈ S.
A property E ∈ E is a class of physically equivalent ideal dichotomic (out-
comes 1, 0) registering devices (briefly, registrations) which may test physical
objects.3
The above notions do not distinguish between classical and quantum me-
chanics. The mathematical representation of physical systems, states and prop-
erties are different, however, in the two theories. Let us resume these represen-
tations in the case of QM.
Every physical system Ω is associated with a Hilbert space H over the field
of complex numbers (we use the Dirac notation | ·〉 in order to denote vectors
of H in the following).
Let us denote by (L(H),⊂) the partially ordered set (briefly, poset) of all
closed subspaces of H (here ⊂ denotes set-theoretical inclusion), and let A ⊂
L(H) be the set of all one-dimensional subspaces of H. Then (in absence of
superselection rules) a mapping
ϕ : S ∈ S −→ ϕ(S) ∈ A
exists which maps bijectively the set S of all states of Ω onto A,4 and a
mapping
χ : E ∈ E −→ χ(E) ∈ L(H)
exists which maps bijectively the set E of all properties of Ω onto L(H).5
2.2 Physical Quantum Logic
The poset (L(H),⊂) is characterized by a set of mathematical properties. In
particular, it is a complete, orthocomplemented, weakly modular, atomic lattice
which satisfies the covering law(13,27−30). We denote by ⊥, ⋓ and ⋒ orthocom-
plementation, meet and join, respectively, in (L(H),⊂), and remind that ⋓
coincides with the set-theoretical intersection ∩ of subspaces of H, while ⊥ does
not generally coincide with the set-theoretical complementation ′, nor ⋒ coin-
cides with the set-theoretical union ∪. Furthermore, we denote the minimal
element {| 0〉} and the maximal element H of (L(H),⊂) by O and I, respec-
tively. Finally, we note that A obviously coincides with the set of all atoms of
(L(H),⊂).
2The notion of physical equivalence for preparing or registering devices is not trivial.(11,21)
We do not discuss it here for the sake of brevity.
3Note that a registration may act as a new preparation of the physical object x, so that
the state of x may change after a test on it.
4It follows easily that every state S can also be represented by any vector | ψ〉 ∈ ϕ(S) ∈ A,
which is the standard representation adopted in elementary QM. Moreover, a state S is usually
represented by an (orthogonal) projection operator on ϕ(S) in more advanced QM. However,
the representation ϕ introduced here is more suitable for our purposes in the present paper.
5Equivalently, a property is often represented in QM as a pair (A,∆), where is A a self-
adjoint operator onH representing a physical observable, and ∆ a Borel set on the real line.(28)
We do not use this representation, however, in the present paper.
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Let us denote by ≺ the order induced on E , via the bijective representation χ,
by the order ⊂ defined on L(H). Then, the poset (E ,≺) is order-isomorphic to
(L(H),⊂), hence it is characterized by the same mathematical properties char-
acterizing (L(H),⊂). In particular, the unary operation induced on it, via χ, by
the orthocomplementation defined on (L(H),⊂), is an orthocomplementation,
and (E ,≺) is an orthomodular (i.e., orthocomplemented and weakly modular)
lattice, usually called the lattice of properties of Ω. By abuse of language, we
denote the lattice operations on (E ,≺) by the same symbols used above in order
to denote the corresponding lattice operations on (L(H),⊂).
Orthomodular lattices are said to characterize semantically orthomodular
QLs in the literature.(3) The lattice of properties has a less general structure in
QM, since it inherits a number of further properties from (L(H),⊂). Therefore,
(E ,≺) will be called physical QL in this paper.
A further lattice, isomorphic to (E ,≺), will be used in the following. In order
to introduce it, let us consider the mapping
ρ : E ∈ E −→ SE = {S ∈ S | ϕ(S) ⊂ χ(E)} ∈ L(S),
where L(S) = {SE | E ∈ E} is the range of ρ, which generally is a proper
subset of the power set P(S) of S. The poset (L(S),⊂) is order-isomorphic to
(L(H),⊂), hence to (E ,≺), since ϕ and χ are bijective, so that ρ is bijective and
order-preserving. Therefore (L(S),⊂) is characterized by the same mathemati-
cal properties characterizing (E ,≺). In particular, the unary operation induced
on it, via ρ, by the orthocomplementation defined on (E ,≺), is an orthocom-
plementation, and (L(S),⊂) is an orthomodular lattice. We denote orthocom-
plementation, meet and join on (L(S),⊂) by the same symbols ⊥, ⋓, and ⋒,
respectively, that we have used in order to denote the corresponding operations
on (L(H),⊂) and (E ,≺), and call (L(S),⊂) the lattice of closed subsets of S
(the word closed refers here to the fact that, for every SE ∈ L(S), (S⊥E )
⊥ = SE).
We also note that the operation ⋓ coincides with the set-theoretical intersection
∩ on L(S) because of the analogous result holding in (L(H),⊂).6
To close up, let us observe that the unary operation ⊥ defined on L(S) can
be extended to P(S) by setting, for every T ∈ P(S),
T ⊥ = (min{SE ∈ L(S) | T ⊂ SE})
⊥
(the symbol min obviously refers to the order ⊂ defined on L(S)). This
extension will be needed indeed in Sec. 3.2.
2.3 Actual and potential properties
We say that a property E is actual (nonactual) in the state S iff one can perform
a test of E on any physical object x in the state S by means of a registration
6Whenever the dimension of H is finite, the lattice (L(H),⊂) and/or the lattice (L(S),⊂)
can be identified with Birkhoff and von Neumann’s lattice of experimental propositions, which
was introduced in the 1936 paper that started the research on QL.(31) This identification is
impossible, however, if H is not finite-dimensional, since Birkhoff and von Neumann’s lattice
is modular, not simply weakly modular. The requirement of modularity has deep roots in the
von Neumann concept of probability in QM according to some authors.(2)
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r ∈ E, obtaining outcome 1 (0) without modifying S.7
Basing on the above definition, for every state S ∈ S three subsets of E can
be introduced.
ES : the set of all properties that are actual in S.
E⊥S : the set of all properties that are nonactual in S.
EIS : the set E\ES∪E
⊥
S (called the set of all properties that are indeterminate,
or potential, in S).
By using the mathematical apparatus of QM, the sets ES and E⊥S can be
characterized as follows.
ES = {E ∈ E | ϕ(S) ⊂ χ(E)} = {E ∈ E | S ∈ SE}.
E⊥S = {E ∈ E | ϕ(S) ⊂ χ(E)
⊥} = {E ∈ E | S ∈ S⊥E }.
It can also be proved that ES (E⊥S ) coincides with the set of all properties
that have probability 1 (0), according to QM, for every x in the state S, and
that the set EIS (which is non-void in QM, while it would be void in classical
physics) coincides with the set of all properties that have probability different
from 0 and 1 for every x in the state S.
Further characterizations of the above sets can be obtained as follows.(12)
Since the mapping ρ is bijective, while every singleton {S}, with S ∈ S,
obviously is an atom of L(S), one can associate a property ES = ρ−1({S})
(equivalently, ES = χ
−1(ϕ(S))) with every S ∈ S. This property is an atom of
(E ,≺), and is usually called the support of S. The mapping ρ−1 thus induces
a one-to-one correspondence between (pure) states and atoms of (E ,≺). Then,
one can prove the following equalities.
ES = {E ∈ E | ES ≺ E}.
E⊥S = {E ∈ E | E ≺ E
⊥
S }.
EIS = {E ∈ E | ES ⊀ E and E ⊀ E
⊥
S }.
Finally, the following equality also follows from the above definitions.
SE = {S ∈ S | ES ≺ E}.
2.4 Truth in standard QM
No mention has been done of truth values (true/false) in the foregoing sections.
However, we will be concerned with logical structures in Sec. 3, hence it is
natural to wonder what QM says about the truth of a sentence as “the physical
object x has the property E” (briefly, E(x) in the following).
We have already noted in the Introduction that QM usually avoids making
explicit statements regarding individual samples of physical systems. Yet, a
sentence as “the property E is actual in the state S” (Sec. 2.3) intuitively
7One can provide an intuitive support to this definition by noticing that the result obtained
in a test of E on a physical object x in the state S can be attributed to x only whenever S
is not modified by the test. Moreover, only in this case the test is repeatable, i.e., it can be
performed again obtaining the same result.
It is well known that classical physics assumes that tests which do not modify the state S
are always possible, at least as ideal limits of concrete procedures, while this assumption does
not hold in QM.
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means that all physical objects in the state S have the property E. Hence, it
can be translated, in terms of truth, into the sentence “for every physical object
x in the state S, E(x) is true”. This translation shows that QM is concerned
also with truth values of individual statements. Moreover, by considering the
literature on the subject, one can argue that QM more or less implicitly adopts
the following verificationist criterion of truth.(12)
EV (empirical verificationism). The sentence E(x) has truth value true
( false) for a physical object x in the state S iff E is actual (nonactual) in S,
while it is meaningless otherwise.
Criterion EV is obviously at odds with standard definitions in classical logic
(CL), and is suggested by the fact that E can be attributed (not attributed)
to a physical object x in the state S on the basis of an experimental procedure
only when it is actual (nonactual) for x (see Sec. 2.6). Hence, we say that E(x)
is Q-true (Q-false) whenever its truth value is true (false) according to criterion
EV, in order to stress the difference between the truth values introduced in QM
and those introduced in CL.
Because of the foregoing translation, criterion EV implies the following
proposition.
TF. The sentence E(x) is Q-true (Q-false) for a physical object x in the
state S iff it is Q-true (Q-false) for every physical object x in the state S.
Loosely speaking, proposition TF can be rephrased by saying that E(x)
is true (false) in the sense established by criterion EV iff it is certainly true
(certainly false) in the same sense, which explains the intuitive terminology
that we have adopted in the Introduction.
Furthermore, criterion EV implies that E(x) has a truth value in standard
QM iff E ∈ ES ∪E⊥S (of course, E(x) is Q-true iff E ∈ ES , Q-false iff E ∈ E
⊥
S ). It
is then important to observe that the characterizations of ES and E⊥S provided
in Sec. 2.3 show that, for every S ∈ S, one can deduce from theoretical laws
of QM whether a property E belongs to ES ∪ E⊥S . In particular, E belongs to
ES (E⊥S ) iff it has probability 1 (0) for every x in the state S. Hence, one can
predict, for every E ∈ E and x in the state S, whether E(x) is Q-true, Q-false
or meaningless. This result shows that standard QM is a semantically complete
theory(12) and, together with proposition TF, explains the definition of true as
certain, or predictable, which occurs in some approaches to QM.(13,14)
2.5 Nonobjectivity versus objectivity in QM
The position expounded in Sec. 2.4 about the truth value of sentences of the
form E(x), with E ∈ E , is sometimes summarized by saying, briefly, that phys-
ical properties are nonobjective in standard QM (to be precise, only the prop-
erties in EIS should be classified as nonobjective for a given S ∈ S).
Nonobjectivity of properties is supported by a number of arguments. Some
of them are based on empirical results (e.g., the two-slits experiment), some
follow from seemingly reasonable epistemological choices (e.g., the adoption of
a verificationist position, together with the indeterminacy principle) and some
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take the form of theorems deduced from the mathematical apparatus of QM.
These last arguments are usually considered conclusive in the literature. We
remind here the Bell-Kochen-Specker and Bell’s theorems(15−18) which seem to
prove that it is impossible to assign classical truth values to all sentences of the
form E(x), with E ∈ E , without contradicting the predictions of QM.
However, all arguments which show that nonobjectivity of properties is an
unavoidable feature of QM can be criticized (this of course does not make the
claim of nonobjectivity wrong, but only proves that there are alternatives to it).
In particular, one can observe that a no-go theorem as Bell-Kochen-Specker’s is
certainly correct from a mathematical viewpoint, but rests on implicit assump-
tions that are problematic from a physical and epistemological viewpoint.(22−25)
Basing on this criticism, an alternative interpretation (semantic realism, or
SR, interpretation) has been propounded by the author, together with other
authors.(19−23,25,26) As we have already observed in the Introduction, the SR
interpretation adopts a Tarskian theory of truth as correspondence, and all
properties are objective according to it (equivalently, the sentence E(x) has a
truth value defined in a classical way for every physical object x and property
E). According to this interpretation E(x) is certainly true (certainly false) in
the state S, that is, it is true (false) in a classical sense for every x is in the
state S, iff E ∈ ES (E ∈ E⊥S ), hence iff it is Q-true (Q-false) according to the
standard interpretation.
The SR interpretation of QM has some definite advantages. Firstly, it makes
QM compatible with a realistic perspective without requiring any change of
its mathematical apparatus and preserving all statistical predictions following
from the standard interpretation, hence it provides a solution of the quantum
measurement problem.(26) Secondly, it rests on a classical conception of truth
and meaning. Thirdly, it leads one to consider QM as an incomplete theory,(12)
and provides some suggestions about the way in which a more general theory
embodying QM could be constructed.
Also within the SR interpretation one can deduce from theoretical laws of
QM whether E ∈ ES (E ∈ E⊥S ), for a given S ∈ S. Moreover, for every
E ∈ ES∪E⊥S , the sentence E(x) obviously is certainly true, hence true (certainly
false, hence false) iff E ∈ ES (E ∈ E⊥S ). On the contrary, no prediction of the
truth value of E(x) can be done if E /∈ ES∪E⊥S . Thus, the difference between the
standard and the SR interpretation reduces to the fact that, whenever E ∈ EIS ,
E(x) is meaningless within the former, while it has a truth value that cannot
be predicted by QM within the latter.
2.6 Empirical proof in QM
The results at the end of Secs. 2.4 and 2.5 show that, whenever x is in the
state S, the truth value of the sentence E(x) can be predicted (or theoretically
proved) iff E ∈ ES ∪ E⊥S , both in the standard and in the SR interpretation.
One is thus led to wonder whether and when the truth value of E(x) can be
determined empirically. At first glance, it seems sufficient to test x by means
of a registering device belonging to E (Sec. 2.1). This is untrue according
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to the standard as well as the SR interpretation. Indeed, both interpretations
maintain that a single test modifies, whenever E /∈ ES ∪ E⊥S , the state S of
the physical object x, so that its result refers to the final state after the test,
which is different from S (moreover, within the standard interpretation, E(x)
has no truth value whenever E /∈ ES ∪ E
⊥
S ). Thus, a test of E(x) is physically
meaningful iff E ∈ ES ∪ E⊥S , since only in this case it does not modify the state
S. It follows that an empirical proof of the truth value of E(x) can be given
iff a theoretical proof of this value exists, and it consists in checking whether
E ∈ ES or E ∈ E⊥S . Then, the characterizations of ES and E
⊥
S in Sec. 2.3
suggest the empirical procedures to be adopted. Indeed, they show that E ∈ ES
(E ∈ E⊥S ) iff ES ≺ E (E ≺ E
⊥
S ), or, equivalently, iff S ∈ SE (S ∈ S
⊥
E ). Hence,
one can get an empirical proof that E(x) is Q-true (Q-false) within the standard
interpretation, or equivalently, that E(x) is certainly true, hence true (certainly
false, hence false) within the SR interpretation, by checking whether the state S
of x belongs to the set SE (S⊥E ). The empirical procedure required by this check
is rather complex, since it does not reduce to a test of E on the physical object
x, but consists in testing a huge number of physical objects in the state S by
means of registrations belonging to E, in order to show that all of them yield
outcome 1 (0) (it has been proven elsewhere(26) that this procedure actually
tests a quantified statement, or a second order physical property).
We conclude by noticing that truth and empirical provability of truth co-
incide within the standard interpretation of QM, which expresses the verifica-
tionist position that characterizes this interpretation. On the contrary, within
the SR interpretation of QM the concepts of truth and empirical provability of
truth are different, in accordance with the well known distinction between truth
and epistemic accessibility of truth in classical logic.
3 QL as a pragmatic language
We aim to show in this section that physical QL can be recovered as a pragmatic
language in the sense established in Ref. 27. It is noteworthy that, by weakening
slightly the assumptions introduced in Ref. 27, one could perform this task
without choosing between the standard and the SR interpretation of QM (see
footnotes 8 and 9). We adopt however the SR interpretation in this section, since
we maintain that the verificationist attitude of the standard interpretation is
epistemologically and philosophically doubtful, but we point out by means of
footnotes the simple changes to be introduced in order to attain the same results
within the standard interpretation.
3.1 The general pragmatic language LP
Let us summarize briefly the construction of the general pragmatic language LP
introduced in Ref. 27.
The alphabetAP of LP contains as descriptive signs the propositional letters
p, q, r,...; as logical-semantic signs the connectives q, ∧, ∨,→ and↔; as logical-
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pragmatic signs the assertion sign ⊢ and the connectives N , K, A, C and E; as
auxiliary signs the round brackets (.). The set ψR of all radical formulas (rfs) of
LP is made up by all formulas constructed by means of descriptive and logical-
semantic signs, following the standard recursive rules of classical propositional
logic (a rf consisting of a propositional letter only is then called atomic). The
set ψA of all assertive formulas (afs) of L
P is made up by all rfs preceded by
the assertive sign ⊢ (elementary afs), plus all formulas constructed by using
elementary afs and following standard recursive rules in which N , K, A, C and
E take the place of q, ∧, ∨, → and ↔, respectively.
A semantic interpretation of LP is then defined as a pair ({1, 0}, σ), where σ
is an assignment function which maps ψR onto the set {1, 0} of truth values (1
standing for true and 0 for false), following the standard truth rules of classical
propositional calculus.
Whenever a semantic interpretation σ is given, a pragmatic interpretation
of LP is defined as a pair ({J, U}, piσ), where piσ is a pragmatic evaluation
function which maps ψA onto the set {J, U} of justification values following
justification rules which refer to σ and are based on the informal properties
of the metalinguistic concept of proof in natural languages. In particular, the
following justification rules hold.
JR1. Let α ∈ ψR; then, piσ(⊢ α) = J iff a proof exists that α is true, i.e.,
that σ(α) = 1 (hence, piσ(⊢ α) = U iff no proof exists that α is true).
JR2. Let δ ∈ ψA; then, piσ(Nδ) = J iff a proof exists that δ is unjustified,
i.e., that piσ(δ) = U .
JR3. Let δ1, δ2 ∈ ψA; then,
(i) piσ(δ1Kδ2) = J iff piσ(δ1) = J and piσ(δ2) = J ,
(ii) piσ(δ1Aδ2) = J iff piσ(δ1) = J or piσ(δ2) = J ,
(iii) piσ(δ1Cδ2) = J iff a proof exists that piσ(δ2) = J whenever piσ(δ1) = J ,
(iv) piσ(δ1Eδ2) = J iff piσ(δ1Cδ2) = J and piσ(δ2Cδ1) = J .
Furthermore, the following correctness criterion holds in LP .
CC. Let α ∈ ψR; then, piσ(⊢ α) = J implies σ(α) = 1.
Finally, the set of all pragmatic evaluation functions that can be associated
with a given semantic interpretation σ is denoted by Πσ.
3.2 The quantum pragmatic language LPQ
The quantum pragmatic language LPQ that we want to introduce here is obtained
by specializing syntax, semantics and pragmatics of LP . Let us begin with the
syntax. We introduce the following assumptions on LPQ.
A1. The propositional letters p, q, ... are substituted by the symbols E(x),
F (x), ..., with E, F , ... ∈ E.
A2. The set ψ
Q
R of all rfs of L
P
Q reduces to the set of all atomic rfs of L
P
Q
(in different words, if α is a rf of LPQ, then α = E(x), with E ∈ E).
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A3. Only the logical-pragmatic signs ⊢, N , K and A appear in the afs of
LPQ.
The substitution in A1 aims to suggest the intended interpretation that we
adopt in the following. To be precise, the rfs E(x), F (x), ... are interpreted
as sentences stating that the physical object x has the properties E, F , ...,
respectively (Sec. 2.4).
The restriction in A2 aims to select rfs that are interpreted as testable sen-
tences, i.e., sentences stating testable physical properties (Sec. 2.1), so that
physical procedures exist for testing their truth values (which may not occur in
the case of a rf of the form, say, E(x)∨F (x); note that a similar restriction has
been introduced in Ref. 27 when recovering intuitionistic propositional logic
within LP ).
The restriction in A3 is introduced for the sake of simplicity, since only the
pragmatic connectives N , K and A are relevant for our goals in this paper.
Because of A1, A2 and A3, the set ψ
Q
A of afs of L
P
Q is made up by all formulas
constructed by means of the following recursive rules.
(i) Let E(x) be a rf. Then ⊢ E(x) is an af.
(ii) Let δ be an af. Then, Nδ is an af.
(iii) Let δ1 and δ2 be afs. Then, δ1Kδ2 and δ1Aδ2 are afs.
Let us come now to the semantics of LPQ. We introduce the following as-
sumption on LPQ.
A4. Every assignment function σ defined on ψ
Q
R is induced by an interpre-
tation ξ of the variable x that appears in the rfs into a universe U of physical
objects, hence σ = σ(ξ) and the values of σ on ψQR are consistent with (not
necessarily determined by) the laws of QM within the intended interpretation
established above.
Let us comment briefly on assumption A4.
Firstly, note that the interpretation ξ was understood in Sec. 2.1, when we
introduced the informal expression “the physical object x is in the state S”.
Secondly, observe that the requirement that σ = σ(ξ) be consistent with the
laws of QM (briefly, QM-consistent) obviously follows from the fact that these
laws, via intended interpretation, establish relations among the truth values
of elementary rfs of LPQ whenever a specific physical object is considered. We
denote by Σ in the following the set of all QM-consistent assigment functions.
Thirdly, note that, since σ = σ(ξ), there may be many interpretations of the
variable x that lead to the same assigment function.
Finally, observe that the universe U can be partitioned into (disjoint) subsets
of physical objects, each of which consists of physical objects in the same state
(different subsets corresponding to different states). Thus, specifying the state
S of x means requiring that the interpretation ξ of x that is considered maps x
on a physical object in the subset corresponding to the state S, hence it singles
out a subclass ΣS ⊂ Σ of assigment functions. All functions in ΣS assign truth
value 1 (0) to a sentence E(x) ∈ ψQR whenever E ∈ ES (E
⊥
S ), while the truth
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values assigned by different functions in ΣS to E(x) may differ if E /∈ ES ∪E⊥S .
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Let us come now to the pragmatics of LPQ. We introduce the following
assumption on LPQ.
A5. Let a mapping ξ be given which interpretes the variable x in the rfs of
LPQ on a physical object in the state S. A proof that the rf E(x) is true (false)
consists in performing one of the empirical procedures mentioned in Sec. 2.6
and showing that E ∈ ES (E ∈ E⊥S ).
Assumption A5 is obviously suggested by the intended interpretation dis-
cussed above. Taking into account A1 and JR1 in Sec. 3.1, it implies the
following statement.
P. Let E(x) be a rf of LPQ, let ξ be an interpretation of the variable x on a
physical object in the state S, and let SE be defined as in Sec. 2.2. Then,
piσ(ξ)(⊢ E(x)) = J iff S ∈ SE,
piσ(ξ)(⊢ E(x)) = U iff S /∈ SE.
The above result specifies piσ(ξ) on the set of all elementary afs of L
P
Q and
shows that it depends only on the state S. Hence, we write piS in place of
piσ(ξ) in the following (for the sake of brevity, we also agree to use the intuitive
statement “the physical object x is in the state S” introduced in Sec. 2.1 in
place of the more rigorous statement “the variable x is interpreted on a physical
object in the state S”).
Statement P provides the starting point for introducing a set-theoretical
pragmatics for LPQ, as follows.
Firstly, we introduce a mapping
f : δ ∈ ψQA −→ Sδ ∈ P(S)
which associates a pragmatic extension Sδ with every assertive formula δ ∈
ψQA, defined by the following recursive rules.
(i) For every E(x) ∈ ψQR, f(⊢ E(x)) = S⊢E(x) = SE.
(ii) For every δ ∈ ψQA, f(Nδ) = SNδ = S
⊥
δ .
(iii) For every δ1, δ2 ∈ ψ
Q
A, f(δ1K δ2) = Sδ1Kδ2 = Sδ1 ∩ Sδ2 .
(iv) For every δ1, δ2 ∈ ψ
Q
A, f(δ1A δ2) = Sδ1Aδ2 = Sδ1 ∪ Sδ2 .
Secondly, we rewrite statement P above substituting S⊢E(x) to SE in it.
P′. Let ⊢ E(x) be an elementary af of LPQ and let x be in the state S. Then,
piS(⊢ E(x)) = J iff S ∈ S⊢E(x),
piS(⊢ E(x)) = U iff S /∈ S⊢E(x).
Thirdly, we note that statement P′ defines the pragmatic evaluation function
piS on all elementary afs of L
P
Q.
8Assumption A4 can be stated unchanged whenever the standard interpretation of QM is
adopted instead of the SR interpretation. In this case, however, for every ξ, σ(ξ) is defined
only on a subset of rfs, not on the whole ψQ
R
(which requires a weakening of the assumptions
on σ if one wants to recover this case within the general perspective in Sec. 3.1). Furthermore,
ΣS reduces to a singleton. Indeed, for every interpretation ξ, a state S = S(ξ) exists such
that ξ(x) ∈ S. Then, σ(ξ) is defined on a rf E(x) iff E ∈ ES ∪ E
⊥
S (Sec. 2.4), and does not
change if ξ is substituted by an interpretation ξ′ such that ξ′(x) ∈ S.
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Finally, for every S ∈ S, we extend piS from the set of all elementary afs of
LPQ to the set ψ
Q
A of all afs of L
P
Q bearing in mind JR2 and JR3 in Sec. 3.1,
hence introducing the following recursive rules.
(i) For every δ ∈ ψQA, piS(Nδ) = J iff S ∈ SNδ = S
⊥
δ .
(ii) For every δ1, δ2 ∈ ψ
Q
A, piS(δ1K δ2) = J iff S ∈ Sδ1Kδ2 = Sδ1 ∩ Sδ2 .
(iii) For every δ1, δ2 ∈ ψ
Q
A, piS(δ1A δ2) = J iff S ∈ Sδ1Aδ2 = Sδ1 ∪ Sδ2 .
The above procedure defines, for every S ∈ S, a pragmatic evaluation func-
tion
piS : δ ∈ ψ
Q
A −→ piS(δ) ∈ {J, U}
which provides a set-theoretical pragmatics for LPQ, as stated.
3.3 On the notion of justification in LPQ
The notion of justification introduced in Sec. 3.2 is basic in our approach and
must be clearly understood. So we devote this section to comments on it.
Whenever an elementary af ⊢ E(x) of LPQ is considered, the notion of jus-
tification obviously coincides with the notion of existence of an empirical proof
of the truth of E(x) because of assumption A5 and proposition P in Sec. 3.2,
which fits in with JR1 in Sec. 3.1.
Whenever molecular afs of LP are considered, one can grasp intuitively the
meaning of the notion of justification for them by considering simple instances.
Indeed, let E(x) be a rf and let x be in the state S. We get
piS(N ⊢ E(x)) = J iff S ∈ S⊥E ,
which means, shortly, that it is justified to assert that E(x) cannot be as-
serted iff MQ entails that the truth value of E(x) is false for every x in the state
S. This result, of course, fits in with JR2 in Sec. 3.1.
Furthermore, let E(x) and F (x) be rfs, and let x be in the state S. We get
piS(⊢ E(x)K ⊢ F (x)) = J iff S ∈ SE ∩ SF ,
piS(⊢ E(x)A ⊢ F (x)) = J iff S ∈ SE ∪ SF .
The first equality shows that asserting E(x) and F (x) conjointly is justified
iff both assertions are justified. The second equality shows that asserting E(x)
or asserting F (x) is justified iff one of these assertions is justified. Both these
results, of course, fit in with JR3 in Sec. 3.1.
We add that
piS(⊢ E(x)) = J implies piS(N ⊢ E(x)) = U
and
piS(N ⊢ E(x)) = J implies piS(⊢ E(x)) = U
since SE ∩ S⊥E = ∅. Nevertheless,
piS(⊢ E(x)) = U and piS(N ⊢ E(x)) = U iff S /∈ SE ∪ S⊥E ,
which shows that a tertium non datur principle does not hold for the prag-
matic connective N in LPQ (it has already been proved in Ref. 27 that this
principle does not hold in the general language LP ).
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It is also interesting to note that the justification values of different elemen-
tary afs, say ⊢ E(x) and ⊢ F (x), must be different for some state S, since
SE 6= SF if E 6= F (Sec. 2.2), hence S⊢E(x) 6= S⊢F (x).
Finally, we remind that the general theory of LP associates an assignment
function σ with a set Πσ of pragmatic evaluation functions (Sec. 3.1), hence
this also occurs within LPQ. One may then wonder whether Πσ is necessarily
nonvoid and, if this is the case, whether it may contain more than one prag-
matic evaluation function. In order to answer these questions, let us consider
an interpretation ξ of the variable x that maps x on a physical object in the
state S. Then, ξ determines a unique assignment function σ(ξ) and a unique
pragmatic evaluation function associated with it, that we have denoted by piS ,
for it depends only on the state S. Since every assigment function in Σ is in-
duced by an interpretation ξ because of A4 in Sec. 3.2, this proves that Πσ is
necessarily nonvoid for every σ ∈ Σ. Moreover, note that an interpretation ξ′
of x may exist within the SR interpretation of QM that maps x on a physical
object in the state S′, with S′ 6= S, yet such that σ(ξ′) = σ(ξ). The pragmatic
evaluation functions piS and piS′ are then different, but they are both associated
with the assignment function σ = σ(ξ) = σ(ξ′), so that they both belong to Πσ.
Hence, Πσ may contain many pragmatic evaluation functions.
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3.4 Pragmatic validity and order in LPQ
Coming back to the general language LP , we remind that a notion of pragmatic
validity (invalidity) is introduced in it by means of the following definition.
Let δ ∈ ψA. Then, δ is pragmatically valid, or p-valid (pragmatically
invalid, or p-invalid) iff for every σ ∈ Σ and piσ ∈ Πσ, piσ(δ) = J (piσ(δ) = U).
By using the notions of justification in LPQ, one can translate the notion of
p-validity (p-invalidity) within LPQ as follows.
Let δ ∈ ψQA. Then, δ is p-valid (p-invalid) iff, for every S ∈ S, piS(δ) = J
(piS(δ) = U).
The notion of p-validity (p-invalidity) can then be characterized as follows.
Let δ ∈ ψQA. Then, δ is p-valid (p-invalid) iff Sδ = S (Sδ = ∅).
The set of all p-valid afs plays in LPQ a role similar to the role of tautologies
in classical logic, and some afs in it can be selected as axioms if one tries to
construct a p-correct and p-complete calculus for LPQ. We will not deal, however,
with this topic in the present paper.
Furthermore, let us observe that a binary relation can be introduced in the
general language LP by means of the following definition.
9Assumption A5 in Sec. 3.2 can be stated unchanged if the standard interpretation of
QM is adopted instead of the SR interpretation. In this case, however, it is impossible that a
mapping ξ′ exists such that ξ′(x) ∈ S′, with S 6= S′ and σ(ξ) = σ(ξ′), since σ(ξ) and σ(ξ′)
are defined on different domains (ES ∪ E
⊥
S
and ES′ ∪ E
⊥
S′
, respectively). Hence, an assigment
function σ is associated with a unique state S, and Πσ reduces to the singleton {piS}.
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For every δ1, δ2 ∈ ψA, δ1 ≺ δ2 iff a proof exists that δ2 is justified whenever
δ1 is justified (equivalently, δ1 ≺ δ2 iff δ1Cδ2 is justified).
The set-theoretical pragmatics introduced in Sec. 3.2 allows one to translate
the above definition in LPQ as follows.
For every δ1, δ2 ∈ ψ
Q
A, δ1 ≺ δ2 iff for every S ∈ S, piS(δ1) = J implies
piS(δ2) = J .
The binary relation ≺ can then be characterized as follows.
For every δ1, δ2 ∈ ψ
Q
A, δ1 ≺ δ2 iff Sδ1 ⊂ Sδ2 .
The relation ≺ is obviously a pre-order relation on ψQA, hence it induces
canonically an equivalence relation ≈ on ψQA, defined as follows.
For every δ1, δ2 ∈ ψ
Q
A, δ1 ≈ δ2 iff δ1 ≺ δ2 and δ2 ≺ δ1.
The equivalence relation ≈ can then be characterized as follows.
For every δ1, δ2 ∈ ψ
Q
A, δ1 ≈ δ2 iff Sδ1 = Sδ2 .
3.5 Decidability versus justifiability in LPQ
We have commented rather extensively in Sec. 3.3 on the notion of justification
formalized in LPQ, for every S ∈ S, by the pragmatic evaluation function piS . It
must still be noted, however, that the definition of piS on all afs in ψ
Q
A does not
grant that an empirical procedure of proof exists which allows one to establish,
for every S ∈ S, the justification value of every af of LPQ. In order to understand
how this may occur, note that the notion of empirical proof is defined by A5
for atomic rfs of LPQ and makes explicit reference, for every E(x) ∈ ψ
Q
R , to the
closed subset SE ∈ L(S) associated with E by the function ρ introduced in Sec.
2.2. Basing on this notion, the justification value piS(⊢ E(x)) of an elementary
af ⊢ E(x) ∈ ψQA can be determined by means of the same empirical procedure,
making reference to the closed subset S⊢E(x) = SE associated to ⊢ E(x) by the
function f (Sec. 3.2). Yet, whenever piS is recursively defined on the whole
ψQA, new subsets of states are introduced (as Sδ1 ∪Sδ2) which do not necessarily
belong to L(S). If an af δ is associated by f with a subset that does not belong
to L(S), no empirical procedure exists in QM which allows one to determine
the justification value piS(δ).
We are thus led to introduce the subset ψQAD ⊂ ψ
Q
A of all pragmatically
decidable, or p-decidable, afs of LPQ. An af δ of L
P
Q is p-decidable iff an empirical
procedure of proof exists which allows one to establish whether δ is justified or
unjustified, whatever the state S of x may be.
Because of the remark above, the subset of all p-decidable afs of LPQ can be
characterized as follows.
ψQAD = {δ ∈ ψ
Q
A | Sδ ∈ L(S)}.
Let us discuss some criteria for establishing whether a given af δ ∈ ψQA
belongs to ψQAD.
C1. All elementary afs of ψ
Q
A belong to ψ
Q
AD.
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C2. If δ ∈ ψ
Q
AD, then Nδ ∈ ψ
Q
AD
Indeed, Sδ ∈ L(S) implies S
⊥
δ ∈ L(S).
C3. If δ1, δ2 ∈ ψ
Q
AD, then δ1K δ2 ∈ ψ
Q
AD
Indeed, Sδ1 ∈ L(S) and Sδ2 ∈ L(S) imply Sδ1∩Sδ2 ∈ L(S), since Sδ1∩Sδ2 =
Sδ1 ⋓ Sδ2 because of known properties of the lattice (L(S),⊂) (Sec. 2.2).
C4. If δ1, δ2 ∈ ψ
Q
AD, then δ1A δ2 may belong or not to ψ
Q
AD. To be precise,
it belongs to ψQAD iff Sδ1 ⊂ Sδ2 or Sδ2 ⊂ Sδ1
Indeed, Sδ1 ∪ Sδ2 ∈ L(S) or, equivalently, Sδ1 ∪ Sδ2 = Sδ1 ⋒ Sδ2 , iff one of
the conditions in C4 is satisfied.
It is apparent from criteria C2 and C3 that ψ
Q
AD is closed with respect to the
pragmatic connectives N and K, in the sense that δ ∈ ψQAD implies Nδ ∈ ψ
Q
AD,
and δ1, δ2 ∈ ψ
Q
AD implies δ1Kδ2 ∈ ψ
Q
AD. On the contrary, ψ
Q
AD is not closed
with respect to A, since it may occur that δ1A δ2 /∈ ψ
Q
AD even if δ1, δ2 ∈ ψ
Q
AD.
In order to obtain a closed subset of afs of LPQ, one can consider the set
φQAD = {δ ∈ ψ
Q
A | the pragmatic connective A does not occur in δ}.
The set φQAD obviously contains all elementary afs of L
P
Q, plus all afs of ψ
Q
A
in which only the pragmatic connectives N and K occur. We can thus consider
a sublanguage of LPQ whose set of afs reduces to φ
Q
AD. This new language
is relevant since all its afs are p-decidable, hence we call it the p-decidable
sublanguage of LPQ and denote it by L
P
QD.
3.6 The p-decidable sublanguage LPQD
As we have anticipated in the Introduction, we aim to show in this paper that
the sublanguage LPQD has the structure of a physical QL, hence it provides
a new pragmatic interpretation of this relevant physical structure. However,
this interpretation will be more satisfactory from an intuitive viewpoint if we
endow LPQD with some further derived pragmatic connectives which can be made
to correspond with connectives of physical QL. To this end, we introduce the
following definitions.
D1. We call quantum pragmatic disjunction the connective AQ defined as
follows.
For every δ1, δ2 ∈ φ
Q
AD, δ1AQδ2 = N((Nδ1)K(Nδ2)).
D2. We call quantum pragmatic implication the connective IQ defined as
follows.
For every δ1, δ2 ∈ φ
Q
AD, δ1IQδ2 = (Nδ1)AQ(δ1Kδ2).
Let us discuss the justification rules which hold for afs in which the new
connectives AQ and IQ occur.
By using the function f introduced in Sec. 3.2 we get (since the set-
theoretical operation ∩ coincides with the lattice operation ⋓ in (L(S),⊂), see
Sec. 2.2),
Sδ1AQδ2 = S
⊥
(Nδ1)K(Nδ2)
= (SNδ1 ∩ SNδ2)
⊥ = (S⊥δ1 ⋓ S
⊥
δ2
)⊥ = (Sδ1 ⋒ Sδ2).
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Hence, for every S ∈ S,
piS(δ1AQδ2) = J iff S ∈ Sδ1 ⋒ Sδ2 .
Let us come to the quantum pragmatic implication IQ. By using the defini-
tion of AQ, one gets
δ1IQδ2 = N((NNδ1)K(N(δ1Kδ2)).
By using the function f and the above result about AQ, one then gets
Sδ1IQδ2 = SNδ1 ⋒ Sδ1Kδ2 = S
⊥
δ1
⋒ (Sδ1 ⋓ Sδ2).
It follows that, for every S ∈ S,
piS(δ1IQδ2) = J iff S ∈ S⊥δ1 ⋒ (Sδ1 ⋓ Sδ2).
Let us observe now that LPQD obviously inherits the notions of p-validity and
order defined in LPQ (Sec. 3.4). Hence, we can illustrate the role of the connective
IQ within LPQD by means of the following pragmatic deduction lemma.
PDL. Let δ1, δ2 ∈ φ
Q
AD. Then, δ1 ≺ δ2 iff for every S ∈ S, piS(δ1IQδ2) = J
(equivalently, iff δ1IQδ2 is p-valid).
Proof. The following sequence of equivalences holds.
For every S ∈ S, piS(δ1IQδ2) = J iff for every S ∈ S, S ∈ S⊥δ1 ⋒ (Sδ1 ⋓ Sδ2)
iff S⊥δ1 ⋒ (Sδ1 ⋓ Sδ2) = S iff Sδ1 ⋓ Sδ2 = Sδ1 iff Sδ1 ⊂ Sδ2 iff δ1 ≺ δ2.
PDL shows that the quantum pragmatic implication IQ plays within LPQD a
role similar to the role of material implication in classical logic.
3.7 Interpreting QL onto LPQD
In order to show that the physical QL (E ,≺) introduced in Sec. 2.2 can be
interpreted into LPQD, a further preliminary step is needed. To be precise, let
us make reference to the preorder introduced on ψQA in Sec. 3.4 and consider
the pre-ordered set (φQAD,≺) of all afs of L
P
QD. Furthermore, let us denote by
≈ (by abuse of language) the restriction of the equivalence relation introduced
on ψQA in Sec. 3.4 to φ
Q
AD, and let us denote by ≺ (again by abuse of language)
the partial order induced on φQAD/ ≈ by the preorder defined on φ
Q
AD. Then,
let us show that (φQAD/ ≈,≺) is order isomorphic to (L(S),⊂).
Let us consider the mapping
f≈ : [δ]≈ ∈ ψ
Q
AD/ ≈ −→ Sδ ∈ L(S).
This mapping is obviously well defined because of the characterization of ≈
in Sec. 3.4. Furthermore, the following statements hold.
(i) For every δ ∈ φQAD, one and only one elementary af ⊢ E(x) exists such
that ⊢ E(x) ∈ [δ]≈.
(ii) The mapping f≈ is bijective.
(iii) For every δ1, δ2 ∈ φ
Q
AD, [δ1]≈ ≺ [δ2]≈ iff Sδ1 ⊂ Sδ2 .
Let us prove (i). Consider [δ]≈. Since Sδ ∈ L(S) and ρ is bijective (Sec. 2.2),
a property E ∈ E exists such that E = ρ−1(Sδ), hence Sδ = SE . It follows that
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[δ]≈ contains the af ⊢ E(x), for S⊢E(x) = SE (Sec. 3.2). Moreover, [δ]≈ does
not contain any further elementary af. Indeed, let ⊢ F (x) be an elementary af
of φQAD with E 6= F : then, SE 6= SF , hence S⊢E(x) 6= S⊢F (x), which implies
⊢ F (x) /∈ [δ]≈. Thus, statement (i) is proved.
The proofs of statements (ii) and (iii) are then immediate. Indeed, statement
(ii) follows from (i) and from the definition of f≈, while statement (iii) follows
from (ii) and from the definition of ≺ on φQAD/ ≈.
Because of (ii) and (iii), the poset (φQAD/ ≈,≺) is order-isomorphic to
(L(S),⊂), as stated.
Let us come now to physical QL. We have seen in Sec. 2.2 that (L(S),⊂)
is order-isomorphic to (E ,≺). We can then conclude that (E ,≺) is order-
isomorphic to (φQAD/ ≈,≺), which provides the desired interpretation of a phys-
ical QL into LPQD.
Let us comment briefly on the pragmatic interpretation of physical QL pro-
vided above.
Firstly, we note that our interpretation maps E on the quotient set φQAD/ ≈,
not onto φQAD. Yet, the set of the (well formed) formulas of the lattice (E ,
⊥ ,⋓,⋒)
can be mapped bijectively onto φQAD by means of the mapping induced by the
following formal correspondence.
(i) E ∈ E ←→⊢ E(x) ∈ φQAD.
(ii) ⊥ ←→ N
(iii) ⋓←→ K
(iv) ⋒←→ AQ.
Thus, the formal language of QL, for which the lattice (L(S),⊂) can be
considered as an algebraic semantics,(3) can be substituted by the language
LPQD, for which (L(S),⊂) can be considered as an algebraic pragmatics (by the
way, we also note that the above correspondence makes IQ correspond to a
Sasaki hook, the role of which is well known in QL). This reinterpretation is
relevant from a philosophical viewpoint, since it avoids all problems following
from the standard concept of quantum truth (Sec. 2.4) considering physical
QL as formalizing properties of a quantum concept of justification rather than
a quantum concept of truth. This makes physical QL consistent also with the
classical concept of truth adopted with the SR interpretation of QM (Sec. 2.5).
Furthermore, as we have already observed in the Introduction, it places physical
QL within a general integrated perspective, according to which non-Tarskian
theories of truth can be integrated with Tarski’s theory by reinterpreting them
as theories of metalinguistic concepts that are different from truth (in the case
of physical QL, the concept of empirical justification in QM).
Secondly, we observe that our interpretation has some consequences that
are intuitively satisfactory. For instance, for every state S ∈ S, it attributes
a justification value to every af in φQAD, while it is well known that there are
formulas in physical QL which have no truth value according to the standard
interpretation of QL (Sec. 2.4).
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3.8 Some remarks on a possible calculus for LPQD
One may obviously wonder whether a calculus can be given for the language
LPQD which is pragmatically correct (p-correct) and pragmatically complete (p-
complete). This is not a difficult task if we limit ourselves to the general lattice
structure of (φQAD/ ≈,≺). Indeed, a set of axioms and/or inference rules which
endow φQAD/ ≈ of the structure of orthomodular lattice can be easily obtained
by using the formal correspondence introduced in Sec. 3.7, since this correspon-
dence allows one to translate the axioms and/or inference rules that are usually
stated in order to provide a calculus for orthomodular QL into φQAD (of course,
all the afs produced by this translation are p-valid afs of LPQD). Here is a sample
set of axioms of this kind (where, of course, δ, δ1, δ2 and δ3 are afs of φ
Q
AD)
obtained by translating a set of rules provided by Dalla Chiara and Giuntini.(32)
A1. δIQδ.
A2. ( δ1K δ2)IQδ1.
A3. ( δ1K δ2)IQδ2.
A4. δIQ(NNδ).
A5. (NNδ)IQδ.
A6. ((δ1IQδ2)K(δ1IQδ3))IQ(δ1IQ(δ2Kδ3)).
A7. ((δ1IQδ2)K(δ2IQδ3))IQ(δ1IQδ3).
A8. (δ1IQδ2)IQ((Nδ2)IQ(Nδ1)).
A9. (δ1IQδ2)IQ(δ2IQ(δ1AQ((Nδ1)Kδ2))).
However, in order to obtain physical QL one needs a number of further
axioms, since the structure of (L(H),⊂) must be recovered (Sec. 2.2). Providing
a complete calculus for such a structure is a much more complicate task, which
must take into account a number of mathematical results in lattice theory (in
particular, Soler’s theorem(33)). Therefore we will not discuss this problem in
the present paper.
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